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Abstract
This paper reports the results of an econometric analysis of the
choice between home owning and renting in Australia. Particular
attention is given to assessing the significance of the user cost of
owner-occupied housing for tenure decisions . Using cross-sectional
data from a 1991 housing survey of Sydney and Melbourne , this
study shows that including user costs in the tenure choice model
results in a substantial improvement in goodness-of-fit. The paper
concludes with suggestions for possible applications of the model.
v
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A Model of Housing Tenure Choice in
Australia
Steven C. Bourassa
Introduction
This paper reports the results of an econometric analysis of
housing tenure
choice in Australia. The paper has several aims: (a) to determine the
relative
importance of the various economic and demographic determinants of die
probability of homeownership in Australia; (b) to provide evidence relevant to
the question whedier Goodman (1988) incorrectly omits from his tenure
choice model a measure of the user cost of owner-occupied housing, and (c) to
serve as a basis for further studies of housing tenure choice and demand in
Australia as well as possible comparative studies of ownership rates in
Australia, the United States, and elsewhere.
Estimating the probability of ownership
Modeling the tenure choice decision
Theory suggests that a household's tenure choice decision is a function of
household income, the relative costs of owning and renting, and demographic
variables such as age and household size. The tenure choice decision is
therefore modeled as a function of economic and demographic variables:
Prob(own) = f(yj, Ojm/rm , dj) ( 1
)
where yj is household j's income, ojm is the household's periodic cost of
owning a dwelling in housing market m, rm is the periodic cost of renting a
dwelling in that market, and dj is a vector of demographic characteristics of
the household. Household income may be divided into permanent and
transitory components, yjp and yj t, because these are likely to have different
effects on the tenure decision. The annual cost of owning a dwelling, ojm , is
the household’s user cost, uj, multiplied by the market price, pm . The user
cost takes into account the effects of taxes, interest rates, inflation,
2
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depreciation, and maintenance expenses on the cost of owner-occupied
housing.
Goodman (1988) specifies a somewhat different tenure choice model:
Prob(own) = g(yj, pm/rm , pj/rj, dj) (2)
where pj and rj are the value and rent of the individual dwelling occupied by
each household. The model omits the household's user cost, but includes a
variable, pj/rj, that purports to measure expectations about capital gains, which
are one component of the user cost. Goodman argues that, given the market
price/rent ratio, a high individual price/rent ratio suggests high capital gains
expectations. He further argues that this measure should be positively related
to the probability of ownership. His empirical results seem to support this
hypothesis, as do the more recent results obtained by Wachter and Megbolugbe
(1992). The individual price/rent ratio is endogenous, however, and should
not be included in the model. Given a decision to own, households will likely
choose houses that are expected to offer high capital gains over those expected
to yield low gains, but it is incorrect to model the tenure choice decision as a
function of a characteristic of the individual dwelling that is subsequently
purchased or rented.
The present paper compares the explanatory power of tenure choice models
that both exclude and include measures of user costs. The models are
estimated with cross-sectional data from the 1991 Housing and Locational
Choice Survey (HALCS). 1 Sample means for the variables employed in this
study are reported in Table l.2 Because survey data are available only for
Sydney and Melbourne, the results of this study are not necessarily
*A logit analysis of choice of dwelling type using the HALCS data is reported in Industry
Commission (1993), Appendix B.
2Although there were 8,530 observations in the HALCS sample, only 7,544 cases had
sufficiently complete responses to be usable in the present study.
3Table 1. Sample means: owners, renters, and
pooled sample
n
%
Income variables
Household income
Permanent income
Transitory income
Price variables
Market price/rent ratio (a)
Relative cost ratio
Demographic variables
Head's age
Marital status:
Married
Never married
Divorced/separated
Widowed
Female head
Household size
Number of dependent children
Security of tenure (b)
Country or region of birth:
Australia
New Zealand
United Kingdom/Ireland
Southern Europe (c)
Other Europe
South East Asia
Far East Asia
Indian Sub-Continent
Middle East
Other countries (d)
Owners Renters Pooled
sample
5396 2148 7544
71.5 28.5 100.0
35199 25919 32557
31550 27000 30255
3649 -1081 2302
17.96 18.11 18.00
1.948 2.299 2.048
51.6 38.5 47.9
0.747 0.470 0.668
0.067 0.303 0.134
0.069 0.154 0.093
0.117 0.073 0.105
0.238 0.350 0.270
2.93 2.67 2.86
0.82 0.73 0.79
0.466 0.098 0.361
0.641 0.579 0.623
0.012 0.043 0.021
0.089 0.088 0.089
0.091 0.021 0.071
0.078 0.052 0.070
0.022 0.071 0.036
0.009 0.024 0.013
0.011 0.018 0.013
0.026 0.038 0.030
0.021 0.066 0.034
Notes:
(a) Price/rent ratios are based on annual rents.
(b) 1 if household identified security/insecurity of tenure as primary advantage/disadvantage
of current tenure status; 0 otherwise.
(c) Includes Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia.
(d) All countries not included in the other categories.
4
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representative of the total Australian population. 3 However, approximately 39
per cent of the total population lived in the two metropolitan areas at the 1991
census. The ownership rate in the sample, 71.5 per cent, is higher than the
67.3 per cent national figure found in the 1991 census.4 On the other hand,
average household income as reported in the HALCS data is much lower than
that reported in the 1990 ABS survey. 5 These observations suggest that
particular care should be taken in interpreting the sample statistics.
A series of models were estimated:
Model 1: Prob(own) = T i(yj, pm/rm, dj) (3)
Model 2: Prob(own) = T2(ypj, y tj, Pm/rm , dj) (4)
Model 3: Prob(own) = T3(ypj, y tj, ojm/rm , dj) (5)
Model 2 simply tests the proposition that separate measures of permanent and
transitory income explain more than the total household income variable in
Model 1 .6 Model 3 multiplies the market price/rent ratio by the household's
user cost for owner-occupied housing. In each model, the vector of
demographic variables includes the household head's age, marital status, sex,
and country or region of birth, household size, and level of concern, as
expressed in the survey, about security of tenure. Marital status is captured by
three dummy variables: never married, divorced or separated, and widow or
widower; the default variable is married. In view of the high rates of
immigration into Australia, country or region of birth is specified in some
3The Australian Bureau of Statistics conducted surveys in Adelaide and Canberra, but is not
planning to release the data.
4The rental sector in Australia is primarily private, with only about 6 percent of all dwellings
owned publicly.
5lt is not surprising that income was systematically under-reported in the HALCS, because
only one question was asked about income. In contrast, die ABS survey asked numerous
detailed questions.
^Incomes were adjusted to reflect the relative cost of living in Sydney and Melbourne
(virtually all of the difference is due to die relative cost of housing).
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detail, using 10 dummy variables (the default is Australia). All of the
estimation results are shown in Table 2, which reports the marginal
probabilities (9P/3x, where P is the probability of ownership and x refers to
the explanatory variables) rather than the logit coefficients.
Permanent and transitory income
Goodman (1988) observes that it is likely that the permanent and transitory
components of household income affect housing decisions, including tenure
choice decisions, in different ways. Total household income may reflect
temporary shocks (both positive and negative) that do not have as great an
effect on tenure choice as expected permanent income.7 Thus, the marginal
probability associated with permanent income should be greater than that for
transitory income. In Goodman's model, estimates of permanent income are
obtained from separate owners' and renters' income regressions. Separating
owners and renters in this way might introduce selection bias from current
tenure status back to the income estimation: owners may work more because
they decided to be owners. In other words, separate income regressions
probably make the permanent and transitory income estimates endogenous.
For this reason, owners and renters are pooled in the regression results
presented in Table 3. The permanent income equation incorporates various
aspects of human capital and demographic factors that would be expected to
explain permanent income.8 The equation was estimated using a transformed
7 1*1 3 dynamic model
' P°sitive transitory income would be likely to help households to
overcome downpayment constraints (Dynarski and Sheffrin 1985).
^Ideally, one would want to estimate permanent income from panel data rather than a single
yeat^s income (e.g., as in Henderson and Ioannides [1987]), but the HALCS data do not
allow for this. Zorn's (1988) method could possibly be applied, although it is not clear that
the result would be worth the additional effort, particularly in the absence of information
about assets. It should also be noted that respondents were reponsible for nominating thehousehold head, and approximately 10 percent of married couples chose the wife. The
6Housing Tenure Choice in Australia
Table 2. Tenure choice logit results (a)
Unrestricted log likelihood (In L)
Restricted log likelihood (In Lr)
Chi-square (-2[ln L - In Lr])
Significance level
Prediction error rate (b)
Constant
Income variables
Household income
Permanent income
Transitory income
Price and user cost variables
Market price/rent ratio
Relative cost ratio
Demographic variables
Head's age
Marital status: (c)
Never married
Divorced/separated
Widowed
Female head
Household size
Number of dependent children
Concern for security of tenure
Country or region of birth: (d)
New Zealand
United Kingdom/Ireland
Southern Europe
Other Europe
South East Asia
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
-3016
-3003
-2225
-4507
-4507
-4507
2981 3006 4564
0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
0.181 0.180 0.124
-0.35002
-0.47866 1.3264
-2.376
-2.951 5.309
4.8146E-06
6.100
7.0696E-06
-2.5735E-06
4.924 -1.303
3.9976E-06 5.5745E-06
4501 4.643
-0.0090875
-0.0078549
-1.306 -1.124
-0.67033
-7.786
0.010217 0.010901 0.0065679
8.990 9.155 4.231
-0.12941 -92447
-0.29512
-2.893 -1.898 -4.044
-0.12801 -0.094153 -0.29096
-2.587 -1.801 -3.604
-0.082143 -0.046077 -0.19436
-1.359 -0.733 -2.071
-0.011389 -0.0045452 0.012405
-0.325 -0.129 0.250
0.0068723 0.0021915 0.0024126
0.370 0.118 0.091
0.026156 0.028481 0.29352
1.196 1.303 0.964
0.29823 0.30017 0.23922
8.055 8.104 4.785
-0.17924 -0.18078 -0.13964
-2.152 -2.165 -1.223
-0.074905 -0.076975 -0.075125
-1.637 -1.681 -1.217
0.15934 0.18332 0.093464
2.213 2.520 0.937
0.0010127 0.017464 -0.0052516
0.019 0321 -0.069
-0.13402 -0.12089 -0.10283
-2.114 -1.895 -1.208
characteristics of the self-nominated head were used for the income regression.
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Table 2. Tenure choice logit results (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Country or region of birtli (continued):
Far East Asia -0.14102
-0.13554 -0.10142
- 1.331 - 1.280 -0.684
-0.11047 -0.10042 -0.11997
- 1.067 -0.967 -0.860
Indian Sub-Continent
Middle East -0.055256 -0.034888 -0.016210
Other countries
-0.777 -0.487 -0.158
-0.22589 -0.21196 -0.17067
-3.369 -3.143 - 1.847
Notes:
(a) Dependent variable in each model is the probability of ownership; die table gives the
marginal
probabilities, aP/3x, where P refers to the probability of ownership; t-statistics are in italics.
(b) Error rate refers to the proportion of households assigned to the incorrect tenure (based
on application of the 0.5 rule to fitted values).
(c) The default variable is married (including de facto).
(d) The default variable is Australia.
dependent variable, with a Box-Cox parameter of X = 0.5 (a square root
transformation), as recommended by Goodman.9 The explanatory power of
this equation compares favorably to previous results. Most of the variables are
statistically significant and all have the expected signs.
9For a dependent variable, y > 0, Box and Cox (1964) proposed the following
transformation: z(k) = (y^- \)fk if X * 0 or log y if X = 0. This transformation is
attractive because it allows one to systematically test a continuous range of possible
transformations, from linear through square root to logarithmic. The Box-Cox parameter
used by Goodman was found to give the best fit for Australia.
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1 able 3. Permanent income regression (a)
R-squared 0.4923
Adjusted R-squared 0.4912
n 7593
X
0.5
Independent variables Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 109.381 19.657
Education ofhousehold head (b)
Some secondary 8.868 2.064
Completed secondary 36.565 7.091
Trade certificate or diploma 43.981 10.346
Bachelor's degree 103.732 20.926
Post-graduate qualification 130.219 13.908
Age of household head (c)
15 to 24 18.191 2.674
25 to 29 65.641 11.302
30 to 34 81.485 14.818
35 to 44 92.174
'
.
18.340
45 to 54 82.671 15.857
55 to 64 39.742 7.663
65 to 74 3.703 0.718
Country of birth ofhead (d)
Australia/New Zealand 39.658 14.969
United Kingdom/lreland 41.527 9.502
Other variables
Married head 87.899 29.780
Male head 19.699 6.480
Working spouse 68.983 27.108
Notes:
(a) Dependent variable is a Box-Cox transformation of annual household income (see text).
(b) Default variable is no secondary education.
(c) Default variable is age 75 and over.
(d) Default variable is all other countries.
The predicted values from the permanent income equation were re-
transformed and then used as estimates of permanent income in the tenure
choice equation. Transitory income was defined as the difference between
actual household income and permanent income. This residual difference has a
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positive mean due to the non-linear
transformation of the dependent variable.
Replacing actual household income with these
two components of mcome
yields the tenure choice results shown under
Model 2 in Table 2. As the table
shows, the marginal probability associated
with permanent income is greater
than that of household income. As expected,
transitory income has a positive
effect on the probability of ownership, but a
smaller marginal probability than
permanent income.
Relative costs of owning and renting
The market price/rent ratios for Sydney and Melbourne are
taken from
Bourassa and Hendershott (1993). The price/rent ratios in the two
cities were
19.9 and 16.1, respectively, reflecting the relatively steeper
increase in real
house prices in Sydney in the late 1980s. Of course, prices and rents are not
directly comparable, as the price of a house does not reflect the true cost to the
occupier. In particular, the price of houses does not take into account the
effects of taxation and inflation. User costs do measure these factors and
therefore they provide a means for translating house prices into periodic costs
that can be compared directly with rents.
The neglect of user costs in a model of tenure choice in the United States is
particularly perplexing, as housing analysts there have for some time
emphasized the importance of the tax advantages of ownership in the tenure
choice decision (Laidler 1969). Moreover, numerous US studies of tenure
choice pre-dating Goodman's 1988 paper include measures of user costs
(Hendershott and Shilling 1982; Henderson and Ioannides 1987; Rosen 1979;
Rosen and Rosen 1980; Rosen, Rosen and Holtz-Eakin 1984). Tax effects are
also important in Australia for a number of reasons. A progressive tax
schedule means that higher income households receive greater advantages from
the non-taxation of imputed rent from owner-occupied houses. Also, because
mortgage interest is not deductible, user costs vary with the household's loan-
10
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to-value ratio (Bourassa and Hendershott 1992). Finally, because personal
income tax returns are filed by individuals only, while houses are typically
owned by couples, the composition of a household and the distribution of
income within that household can have a significant impact on the user cost it
faces.
The calculation of user costs in this paper is based largely on the method
outlined by Haurin, Hendershott, and Kim (forthcoming), with appropriate
modifications for the Australian context. Tenure choice user costs in Australia
are defined as:
Ujm = (1 — Tjm)(l — vj)i + vji — 71 + 8 + pm , (7)
where: ujm is the user cost faced by household j in locality (or market) m; Xjm
is the household’s ’’permanent” tenure choice tax rate; vj is a loan-to-value
ratio; i is the pre-tax financing rate; % is the expected rate of house price
inflation; 8 is the rate of depreciation and maintenance costs; and pm is the
property tax rate.l° The loan-to-value ratio is the present value of the
household’s expected annual loan-to-value ratios over the estimated remaining
holding period. Because HALCS does not include information on the size of
purchasing households’ mortgages, it was necessary to predict loan-to-value
ratios for both owners and renters using an equation estimated from another
data set (the 1990 Survey of Income and Housing Costs and Amenities).
Details of this estimation and the calculation of present-value-equivalent loan-
to-value ratios are reported in the Appendix.
Following Hendershott and Slemrod (1983), the appropriate tax rate for a
tenure choice user cost is not the marginal rate faced by the household, but
rather the average rate at which tax deductible housing costs are expected to be
lONote that property taxes—like mortgage interest payments—are not deductible in
Australia.
11
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deductible (imputed rent from owner-occupied housing
is in effect
"deductible" because it is not taxed):
Tjm = (TRjm -Tojm)/{Pjm[(l “ vj)^)- ^
Tliis tax rate is an expected or "permanent" rate because
it is based on
permanent income, rather than actual income, and on the household
s present-
value-equivalent loan-to-value ratio, rather than its current ratio.
Here, TRjm
is the income tax household j residing in market m would pay if it rented,
and
Tojm is the income tax it would pay if it owned a dwelling of value pjm- For
households headed by single persons, TRjm anci Fojm are based on the income
tax and Medicare (national health insurance) levy that would be paid by the
household head only. 11 For married or de facto couple households, the
relevant amounts are the sums of the taxes that would be paid by the head and
spouse, and adjustments to income to convert owners’ incomes to renters’
incomes and vice versa are split evenly between the spouses. 12 For renting
households, TRjm is simply the sum of the income tax and Medicare levy the
household would pay given estimated permanent income and number of
dependents, and Tojm is calculated by subtracting pjmO - vj)i from income.
The latter is an estimate of the amount by which taxable income would be
reduced owing to the non-taxable equity invested in the house rather than
taxable assets. For owning households, the calculation of TRjm requires that
PjmO - vcj)i be added to permanent income, where v cj refers to the estimated
1 lrThe income data in the HALCS are not precise enough to permit the calculation of rebates
(tax credits); nor is it possible to accurately estimate the amount of deductions taken by each
household.
12For the case of married couples, it is not obvious how transitory (and permanent) income
should be allocated to the head and spouse. One option would be to assume that all or most
of the couple’s transitory income is earned by the female member, while another option
would be to allocate transitory income to the head and spouse in proportion to actual
income. A compromise between these extremes was adopted: half of transitory income
was allocated to each member of the couple.
12
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current loan-to-value ratio. Then Tojm is based on income as a renter less
Pjm(l - vj)i, where vj is defined as before (i.e. y the present-value-equivalent
loan-to-value ratio). The dwelling value, pjm , is a predicted value which
depends on the household's income and city of residence, but not on current
tenure status or the value of the dwelling currently occupied (details of the
estimation are in the Appendix).
Incorporating the user cost in the relative costs variable (defined as ujmpm/rm)
gives the results shown under Model 3 in Table 2. The marginal probability
of the relative cost variable has the expected sign and is significant. The Chi-
square statistic is substantially greater than that for Model 2, and the prediction
error rate has dropped substantially. Notably, the marginal probability
associated with permanent income is now negative, but not significant. In the
absence of a user cost variable, one would expect permanent income to be
\
positively related to the probability of ownership due to the fact that user costs
and loan-to-value ratios decline with income. However, given the user cost
variable, which is based on permanent income, there is no longer a theoretical
basis for expecting a positive relationship between permanent income and
owning. Thus the negative relationship identified here is not anomalous, and
reflects the residual effect of permanent income once user costs are accounted
for. It is likely that the residual effect of income reflects the tendency of
higher income households to live in inner locations dominated by rental
housing. Transitory income continues to be positively and significantly related
to ownership, as expected.
Demographic variables
Although the primary focus of this paper is on the economic factors affecting
housing tenure choices, the demographic variables merit some discussion. The
vector of demographic variables is specified more fully than in previous
13
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studies. Goodman (1988), for example, includes only household size and
the
race, age, marital status, and sex of the household head. Except
for race,
which is not identified in the HALCS data set, the present study includes these
variables plus: the number of dependent children in the household (defined
according to 1991 income taxation rules); a dummy for those households
identifying security as the primary advantage/disadvantage of their current
tenure; and a set of dummy variables for country or region of birth of the
household head. Also, marital status is specified by three dummy variables
rather than just one.
The results show that specifying marital status with one married/single dummy
variable ignores important differences among the subcategories of single
persons, particularly the differences between widows/widowers and other
singles. Although all categories of single-person households are significantly
less likely to own than married couples, the marginal probability associated
with widowed persons is small relative to those for the other two groups. In
other words, the tenure choices of widowed persons are more like those of
married couples. This is not surprising in view of the fact that widows and
widowers often continue to occupy a house that was purchased when their
spouses were alive.
Numerous studies, including Burgess and Skeltys (1992) and Troy(1991), have
identified desire for security of tenure as a motivation for homeownership. As
Table 1 shows, 47 per cent of owners in the sample identified security of
tenure as the primary advantage of homeownership, while only 10 per cent of
renters identified insecurity of tenure as the primary disadvantage of renting.
Thus it is not surprising that concern for security of tenure is a positive and
significant factor in tenure choice.
14
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Aside from the marital status dummies and concern for security of tenure, age
is the only significant demographic variable. As expected, the marginal
probability associated with age is positive. The marginal probabilities for
household size, number of dependent children, and the dummy for female
heads are all positive, but not significant. It is notable, however, that number
of children has a greater effect on the probability of ownership than does
household size.
Conclusions
This paper has developed and applied a model of housing tenure choice in
Australia. The model improves upon Goodman's tenure choice model by
incorporating the household's tenure choice user cost as part of the variable
measuring the relative cost of owning and renting. This modification results
in a substantial improvement in goodness-of-fit and a corresponding reduction
in the prediction error rate. The importance of the tenure choice user cost in
the Australian model clearly indicates that future work employing US data (or
data from other countries) should also test for the significance of user costs.
Variations in tax rules across countries and over time suggest that user costs
may be significant only in some places and at some times. Thus the finding
that user costs were significant determinants of the probability of ownership in
Australia in 1991 does not necessarily imply that they would have been
significant in the US in that year. In fact, it is quite possible that they would
be less important due to the small range of owner-occupier user costs in the
US following the 1986 Tax Reform Act (Bourassa and Hendershott 1992).
Nevertheless, the relevance of user costs to tenure choice is an empirical issue
that should not be decided a priori .
Another implication of this research is that policy makers concerned with
homeownership rates in Australia should pay attention to user costs. Changes
Housing Tenure Choice in Australia
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in factors affecting user costs
—
particularly changes in the real interest rate
and income tax schedules—are likely to have significant effects on households'
tenure choice decisions. For example, the reduction in marginal tax rates that
has been proposed by the Australian government would result in higher user
costs and, possibly, lower homeownership rates. On the other hand,
reductions in the real interest rate from its current high level would have the
opposite effect.
16
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Appendix: Estimating Loan-to-Value Ratios and House Prices
Loan-to-value ratios were predicted for households in the HALCS data set
(both owners and renters) using results derived from the 1990 Income and
Housing Costs and Amenities Survey. For owning/purchasing households in
Sydney and Melbourne, the current loan-to-value ratio, vc , was regressed on
the log of household income and dummy variables for all of the age groups
defined in the 1990 Survey, with the exception of ages 60 and older (this older
age group served as the default variable). The results were (with t-statistics in
parentheses):
v = -0.053 + 0.0063 In y + 0.482 AGE_
_
+ 0.346 AGE„ 4- 0.276 AGE
(-1.658) (1.930) (15.497) 15-24 (25.827) 25-29 (24.129) 30-34
+ 0.207 AGE_ + 0.117 AGE + 0.078 AGE + 0.043 AGE
(19.924) 35-39 (11.316) 40-44 (6.730) 45-49 (3.594) 50-54
+ 0.022 AGE_
_
(1.781) 55-59
(9)
Survival analysis was used to estimate holding periods for these age groups.
The HALCS data identify households planning to move within 12 months and
include duration of stay (years) at the current dwelling. The survival analysis
was conducted by adding 0.5 to the duration of stay and identifying the stayers'
durations as censored. This yielded an estimate of the total holding period for
each household. Subtracting duration of stay from the total estimated holding
period produced an estimate of the remaining holding period (i.e. the holding
period from the date of the survey). These values were averaged for each age
group with non-zero loan-to-value ratios. Average duration of stay was
subtracted from 20 (the typical loan term) to obtain an estimate of the
remaining term of the mortgage loan for each age group.
The present value of expected loan-to-value ratios over the remaining holding
period was calculated by solving
£(l-v*)ip
t
^(l-v
t
)ip
t
t=l (l+i)
1
t=l (l+i)
1
(10)
for v*. Here pt is an index of expected house prices over the remaining
holding period n, and vt is the projected declining loan-to-value ratio, given
the age group averages of the current ratios predicted from equation (9) and
the estimated remaining term of the mortgage loan. The resulting present
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value equivalent loan-to-value ratios were regressed on the current
ratios for
each age group to obtain the following:
v* =-0.036 + 1.017 v
(4.063) (27.628)
c (ID
This equation was used to estimate vj for each household given vc .
House prices were estimated from the HALCS data set by regressing the log of
house values (in $1000s) provided by owning respondents on the log of
household income and a dummy variable for Sydney:
In (p /1000) = 4.012 + 0.098 In y + 0.305 SYDNEY.
Jm (12)
House values for both owners and renters were predicted using this equation.
This rather simple method of estimating house value has the virtue of avoiding
any downward bias in the house values estimated for current renters. For
current renters, such bias would result in underestimation of the tax
advantages of owning, and overestimation of user costs and the relative costs
of owning and renting.
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